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Abstract
We consider generalizations of the Gale–Shapley (Amer. Math. Monthly 69 (1962) 9) Stable Mar-
riage Problem to three-sided families. Alkan (Math. Social Sci. 16 (1988) 207) gave an example
which shows that in this case stable matchings do not always exist. Here we provide a simpler exam-
ple demonstrating this fact. Danilov (NATOAdvanced Research Workshop on Mathematical Theory
of Allocation of Discrete Resources: Equilibria, Matching, Mechanisms, Sabanci University, Istan-
bul, Turkey, 16–19 December 2001; Math. Social Sci. 46(2) (2003) 145) proved that stable matchings
always exist for the special case of certain acyclic preferences and he raised the problem for another
special case involving cyclic preferences. Here we show that the answer is still negative by con-
structing a three-sided system with lexicographically cyclic preferences for which no stable matching
exists. Finally, we also consider possible generalizations to s-sided families, for s > 3.
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1. Introduction
The Stable Marriage problemwas considered and solved by Gale and Shapley [6]. Given
two setsM andW (of men and women), |M| = |W | = n, a pair (m,w) ∈ M ×W is called
a family. For each individual there is also given a complete ranking of the individuals in
the other group. More precisely, we write wjmiwk for mi ∈ M , wj ,wk ∈ W , if man
mi prefers woman wj to wk , and similarly, mjwimk , wi ∈ W , mj ,mk ∈ M , if woman
wi prefers mj to mk . It is assumed that for each individual the corresponding preference
forms a complete ordering of the individuals in the other group. A matching is a set of n
families such that each individual inM ∪W belongs to exactly one of these families. Given
a matching M, a family F is said to be breaking (with respect to M) if both members
of F prefer the other more than their respective partners in the families they belong to in
M. The matchingM is called stable if there exists no breaking family with respect to it.
The Stable Matching Theorem of Gale and Shapley [6] claims that such a stable matching
always exists, and can be found in O(n2) time.
The above result of Gale and Shapley [6] induced a signiﬁcant amount of work, relating
to algorithms, lattice structure of solutions, strategic behavior, etc. The wide range of ap-
plications includes on the one end student admissions and medical interns’ and residents’
assignments (see, e.g., [5,6,8,9]) and ranges through economics and social sciences to dis-
crete mathematics on the other end (see, e.g., the solution of Dinitz’s conjecture by Galvin
[7] or the Berge–Duchet conjecture by Boros and Gurvich [2]).
In this short paper, we are interested in generalizations of the Stable Marriage Theorem
for “families” consisting of more than two individuals.
One such generalization involves three groups of individuals (say for instance, men,
women and cats) and a “family” includes one of each type. In a most general setting the
given individual preference for each individual is over all pairs of the other two types.Alkan
[1] gave an example which shows that in this case stable matchings do not always exist. In
the next section, we provide a simpler example that demonstrates this fact.
The natural next step was to consider restricted preference orders. Danilov [3,4] proved
that the Gale–Shapley Theorem generalizes to the case of three-sided systems with the
following preferences: the men primarily care about the women (but coupled with different
women, the same man may have different secondary preferences over the cats), and anal-
ogously, the women primarily care about the men, and ﬁnally the cats may have arbitrary
preferences over all man–woman pairs. Using an extension of the Gale–Shapley algorithm
Danilov showed that in such a case a stable matching always exists. He raised the question
in the same lecture if the same remains true for lexicographically cyclic preferences, in
which the men primarily care about the women, the women primarily care about the cats,
and the cats primarily care about the men. In Section 3 we show that the answer is negative
by constructing a three-sided system with lexicographically cyclic preferences for which
no stable matching exists.
As a further special case, we consider purely cyclic preference orders, in which the men
only care about the women, the women only care about the cats, and the cats only care
about the men. Let us note that such preferences are not complete (e.g., in case of a man, his
preference order is not complete over all possible woman–cat pairs), so we should deﬁne
more precisely the notion of stable matching.We do it in the weakest possible sense. Given
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a matchingM, a family F /∈M is breaking if every member of F strictly prefers his/her/its
partners in F to his/her/its partners in the respective families they belong to inM. (For
instance, a family F = (m,w, c) is not breaking with respect to a matchingM, if m and w
belong to the same family ofM, since in this case themanmwill be equally happy/unhappy
with both families.) As before, the matchingM is called stable if no breaking family exists
with respect to it. The notion of purely cyclic preferences naturally extends to the case of
s-sided systems. We prove in Section 4 that the Gale–Shapley Theorem generalizes to the
case of purely cyclic preferences provided sn, where n is the number of individuals in
each group, leaving the case s <n open.
2. Three-sided families
Let us consider three setsM ,W , C (say, men, women, and cats) having the same cardi-
nality, |M| = |W | = |C| = n. A triple F = (m,w, c) ∈ M ×W × C is called a family. A
set of n familiesM is called a matching if each member ofM ∪W ∪C belongs to exactly
one family F ∈M.
Furthermore, we are given for every manm ∈ M a complete preference orderP(m) over
W × C, i.e. of all woman–cat pairs. We write (wi, cj )m(wi′ , cj ′) if m prefers (wi, cj )
to (wi′ , cj ′). Analogously, we are given complete preference orders P(w) and P(c) for the
women and the cats, respectively over C ×M andM ×W .
Given a matchingM, a family F = (m,w, c) /∈M is called breaking (with respect toM)
if each individual of F prefers the pair of his/her/its partners in F to the pair of his/her/its
partners in the family he/she/it belongs to inM.We call a matchingM stable if no breaking
family exists with respect to it.
Alkan [1] showed that the Gale–Shapley [6] Stable Marriage Theorem does not gener-
alize to the case of three-sided families. He constructed a three-sided example with n = 3
individuals in each group (and appropriate preferences for each individual over all pairs of
possible partners) for which no stable matching exists. Here we provide a simpler example
involving only two individuals in each group, that is n=2. LetM={m1,m2},W={w1, w2},
C = {c1, c2} and let the preferences of the individuals be given by the following:
P(m1) : (w2, c1)m1(w1, c2)m1(w2, c2)m1(w1, c1),
P(m2) : (w2, c1)m2(w1, c1)m2(w2, c2)m2(w1, c2),
P(w1) : (c2,m2)w1(c1,m2)w1(c1,m1)w1(c2,m1),
P(w2) : (c2,m2)w2(c1,m1)w2(c1,m2)w2(c2,m1),
P(c1) : (m1, w2)c1(m2, w1)c1(m1, w1)c1(m2, w2),
P(c2) : (m1, w1)c2(m1, w2)c2(m2, w2)c2(m2, w1).
It is immediate to see that there are 8 possible families formed by these 6 individuals, which
can be grouped into 4 possible matchings:
M1 = {F1a = (m1, w1, c1), F1b = (m2, w2, c2)},
M2 = {F2a = (m1, w2, c2), F2b = (m2, w1, c1)},
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M3 = {F3a = (m1, w2, c1), F3b = (m2, w1, c2)},
M4 = {F4a = (m1, w1, c2), F4b = (m2, w2, c1)}.
With respect to the above preferences, each of these matchings has a breaking family,
showing that no stable matching exists for this example. For instance, it is easy to check
that family F2b is breaking forM1, F3a is breaking for bothM2 andM4, and ﬁnally family
F1b is breaking forM3.
3. Lexicographically cyclic preferences
Let us consider again a three-sided systemwith |M|=|W |=|C|=n, and lexicographically
cyclic preferences, as deﬁned in the introduction, i.e., if w = w′ and (w, c)m(w′, c′) for
some cats c, c′ then (w, c′′)m(w′, c′′′) for all pairs of cats c′′, c′′′. Analogous implications
hold for the preferences of women and cats, too. Let us say that a woman w is the ﬁrst
choice for a man m if (w, c)m(w′, c′) holds for all women w′ = w and all cats c, c′.
Analogously, we shall talk about ﬁrst choices for the women and the cats, as well. Let us
call a family F = (m,w, c) ideal if each member of it is the ﬁrst choice of the cyclically
previous member, i.e., ifw is the ﬁrst choice ofm, c is the ﬁrst choice ofw, andm is the ﬁrst
choice of c. Let us further call a family super-ideal if each pair is the most preferred pair for
the third member of the family, according to his/her/its preference order. The assumption
that preferences are lexicographically cyclic assures that super-ideal families are also ideal.
Theorem 1. In three-sided systems with lexicographically cyclic preferences stable match-
ings always exist if n2, and may fail to exist if n3.
Before the proof of this theorem, let us ﬁrst make a simple but useful observation.
Lemma 1. Let F be an ideal family and letM be a matching. If F ∈M, then no member
of F can belong to a breaking family (with respect toM). Furthermore, a stable matching
must contain every super-ideal family.
Proof. This claim is quite obvious, since by deﬁnition, no member of an ideal family can
“imagine to be happier” with somebody else from the cyclically next group. The second
part is also immediate, since if F /∈M and F is super-ideal, then F is a breaking family for
M. 
Let us show next the easier part of the theorem.
Lemma 2. A stable matching exists in a three-sided system with lexicographically cyclic
preferences whenever n2.
Proof. For n=1 there is nothing to prove. Suppose n=2. Let us ﬁrst assume that both men
as well as both women have no conﬂicts in their ﬁrst choices. In this case we just assign
to each man and each woman his/her ﬁrst choice and obtain two families forming a stable
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matchingM. Indeed, suppose F = (m,w, c) is a breaking family for such a matchingM.
Then m and w must have their ﬁrst choices also in F , implying that F ∈ M which is a
contradiction. Let us now assume that the two men (or the two women) have a conﬂict in
their top preference, that is the same women (respectively the same cat) is their ﬁrst choice.
In this case still there exists an ideal family, which together with the complementary family
forms a stable matching: Let w∗ be the ﬁrst choice woman for both men, let c∗ ∈ C as the
ﬁrst choice of w∗, and let m∗ ∈ M be the ﬁrst choice of c∗. Let F = (m∗, w∗, c∗) and let
F ′ be the complementary family formed by the rest of the individuals. Then the family F
is ideal by its construction, and thusM = {F,F ′} is a stable matching, since no breaking
family can intersect F by Lemma 1, and since in the considered case of n= 2 all families
but F ′ ∈M intersect F . 
Let us show next that the negative part of the Theorem can easily be reduced to the case
of n= 3.
Lemma 3. If a three-sided system Sn, having n individuals in each group, and having
lexicographically cyclic preferences, has no stable matching, then it can be extended to an
analogous system Sn+1 with n + 1 members in each group, which still does not have a
stable matching.
Proof. Let us denote the groups of Sn by M = {m1, . . . , mn}, W = {w1, . . . , wn} and
C = {c1, . . . , cn} and let  denote the lexicographically cyclic preference order in Sn. Let
us introduce three new members, mn+1, wn+1, and cn+1, different from all others, and let
M ′ =M ∪{mn+1},W ′ =W ∪{wn+1}, and C′ =C ∪{cn+1}. Let us next deﬁne an extension
′ of , accommodating the new members, so that the following relations
(wj , ck)′mi (wn+1, cn+1),
(cj ,mk)′wi (cn+1,mn+1),
(mj ,wk)′ci (mn+1, wn+1),
(wn+1, cn+1)′mn+1(wj , ck),
(cn+1,mn+1)′wn+1(ck,mi) and
(mn+1, wn+1)′cn+1(mi, wj )
hold for all i, j, kn. In addition, we assume that ′ agrees with  for all other cases not
involving the newmembers. Clearly, we can do this and ensure that the extended preference
order ′ is still lexicographically cyclic over the n+ 1 member groupsM ′,W ′ and C′.
We claim that the obtained three-sided system Sn+1 with the preference order ′
cannot have a stable matching, either. To see this let us observe ﬁrst that the family
F = (mn+1, wn+1, cn+1) is super-ideal in Sn+1. Thus, by Lemma 1, F is a breaking
family with respect to each matchingM which does not contain it. On the other hand, if
F ∈ M, then no breaking family with respect toM can intersect F , again by Lemma 1.
ThusM is stable inSn+1 if and only ifM\{F } is stable inSn. Since by our assumption
Sn has no stable matching,M cannot be stable, either. 
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Proof of Theorem 1. According to Lemmas 2 and 3, it is enough to construct a three-sided
system with lexicographically cyclical preference order and with n = 3 for which there is
no stable matching. LetM={m1,m2,m3},W ={w1, w2, w3}, and C={c1, c2, c3}, and let
us deﬁne a lexicographically cyclic preference order  satisfying the following relations:
(w1, ci)m(w2, cj )m(w3, ck) for m ∈ {m1,m3},
(w2, ci)m(w3, cj )m(w1, ck) for m=m2,
(wi, c2)m(wi, c1)m(wi, c3) for m ∈ {m1,m2,m3};
(c1,mi)w(c2,mj )w(c3,mk) for w ∈ {w1, w3},
(c2,mi)w(c3,mj )w(c1,mk) for w = w2,
(ci, m2)w(ci,m1)w(ci,m3) for w ∈ {w1, w2, w3};
(m1, wi)c(m2, wj )c(m3, wk) for c ∈ {c2, c3},
(m2, wi)c(m3, wj )c(m1, wk) for c = c1,
(mi, w2)c(mi, w1)c(mi, w3) for c ∈ {c1, c2, c3},
for all 1 i, j, k3. Clearly, the preference order  deﬁned by the above relations is lex-
icographically cyclic. Let us also note the following property of : for each individual,
his/her/its secondary preference does not depend on the ﬁrst partner, moreover, the corre-
sponding sequence of indexes 2,1,3 is the same for all 9 individuals.
There are (3!)2 = 36 possible matchings in this example. We show that for each one of
these there exists a breaking family. For 9 of these 36 matchings there exists in fact a unique
breaking family.We list these matchings together with the corresponding breaking families
ﬁrst.
M1 = {(m1, w1, c1), (m2, w2, c2), (m3, w3, c3)} ←− (m3, w3, c1)= F1,
M2 = {(m1, w1, c2), (m2, w2, c1), (m3, w3, c3)} ←− (m3, w2, c3)= F2,
M3 = {(m1, w1, c2), (m2, w2, c3), (m3, w3, c1)} ←− (m3, w1, c1)= F3,
M4 = {(m1, w1, c2), (m2, w3, c1), (m3, w2, c3)} ←− (m2, w2, c3)= F4,
M5 = {(m1, w2, c2), (m2, w1, c1), (m3, w3, c3)} ←− (m2, w3, c3)= F5,
M6 = {(m1, w2, c2), (m2, w3, c3), (m3, w1, c1)} ←− (m2, w3, c1)= F6,
M7 = {(m1, w2, c2), (m2, w3, c1), (m3, w1, c3)} ←− (m1, w1, c3)= F7,
M8 = {(m1, w3, c3), (m2, w2, c2), (m3, w1, c1)} ←− (m1, w3, c2)= F8,
M9 = {(m1, w3, c2), (m2, w2, c3), (m3, w1, c1)} ←− (m1, w2, c2)= F9.
Let us next consider a matchingM such that (m2, w2, c2) /∈M and (m1, wi, c2) /∈M for
i = 1, 2, 3. Then it is easy to check that (m2, w2, c2) = F10 will be a breaking family for
every such matching. This way we break twenty other matchings, leaving us with only 7 to
check. Finally, we list these 7 matchings with their corresponding breaking families.
M10 = {(m1, w1, c3), (m2, w2, c2), (m3, w3, c1)} ←− (m3, w1, c1)= F3,
M11 = {(m1, w1, c2), (m2, w3, c3), (m3, w2, c1)} ←− (m2, w3, c1)= F6,
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M12 = {(m1, w2, c2), (m2, w1, c3), (m3, w3, c1)} ←− (m2, w3, c1)= F6,
M13 = {(m1, w3, c2), (m2, w1, c1), (m3, w2, c3)} ←− (m1, w2, c2)= F9,
M14 = {(m1, w3, c2), (m2, w1, c3), (m3, w2, c1)} ←− (m1, w2, c2)= F9,
M15 = {(m1, w3, c2), (m2, w2, c1), (m3, w1, c3)} ←− (m1, w2, c2)= F9,
M16 = {(m1, w3, c1), (m2, w2, c2), (m3, w1, c3)} ←− (m1, w1, c3)= F7.
Let us note thatF3, F6, F7, F9 were the only breaking families formatchingsM3,M6,M7,
M9 respectively. Thus the obtained set of 10 breaking families is a minimum cardinality
set necessary to break every matching. 
4. Purely cyclic preferences
Purely cyclic preferences, as deﬁned in the introduction, constitute a further special case
of lexicographically cyclic preferences. Let us formally extend this notion to s member
families where s2 is an integer.
Let Zs = {0, 1, . . . , s − 1} denote the additive group of modulo s addition of integers
and let In = {1, 2, . . . , n}. Let us consider s groups Gj = {(i, j) | i ∈ In} for j ∈ Zs , with
exactly n individuals in each group. Let us further denote the preference order of individual
(i, j) ∈ Gj over the cyclically next groupGj+1 byi,j for all j ∈ Zs (additions within Zs
are taken modulo s). A family consists of exactly one individual from each of the groups.
For simplicity, let us represent a family F ∈ G0 × G1 × · · · × Gs−1 by an associated
vector (f0, f1, . . . , fs−1), where F = {(fj , j) | j ∈ Zs}. A matchingM is a collection of
n pairwise disjoint families. We say that a family F = {(fj , j) | j ∈ Zs} is breaking with
respect to a matchingM, if all individuals (fj , j) ∈ F prefer (fj+1, j + 1) to (i, j + 1),
where (i, j + 1) is their current partner in the family they belong to inM. More formally,
ifM= {F i | i ∈ In}, and F i = {(f ij , j) | j ∈ Zs},for i ∈ In, then F = {(fj , j) | j ∈ Zs}
is breaking with respect toM, if
(fj+1, j + 1)(fj ,j)(f ij+1, j + 1), where fj = f ij ,
for all j ∈ Zs . Finally, we call a matching stable if there is no breaking family with respect
to it.
Let us note that for s = 2 all classical stable matching problems are
purely cyclic by the above deﬁnitions, and thus a stable matching always exists for these
purely cyclic problems when s = 2 by Gale and Shapley [6]. The same question is open
already for s=3, since the negative example for three-sided systems with lexicographically
cyclic preferences in the previous section is not purely cyclic. In this section we prove that
a stable matching always exists for purely cyclic preferences, whenever ns, leaving the
case n> s open.
Before proving our claim, let us introduce a few more notations, to simplify our analysis.
To an s-sided system with purely cyclic preferences let us associate a directed graph
G = (V ,E), where V = G0 ∪ G1 ∪ · · · ∪ Gs−1, and where there is a directed edge from
every individual of Gj to every individual of the cyclically next group Gj+1 for j ∈ Zs .
To a directed edge e = [(i, j), (k, j + 1)] let us associate its rank, denoted by r(e), which
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is the rank of individual (k, j + 1) in the preference list of (i, j), i.e., r(e) = 1 + |{l :
(l, j + 1)(i,j)(k, j + 1)}|. Given a subset W ⊆ V of the vertices of G, let us denote
by G[W ] the subgraph induced by W . We call a directed path P = {(ij , j), (ij+1, j +
1), . . . , (ij+q, j + q)} a best choice path in G[W ], if P ⊆ W and the directed edges of
this path el = [(ij+l , j + l), (ij+l+1, j + l + 1)] have the lowest possible rank among the
outgoing edges from (ij+l , j + l) in G[W ] for l = 0, 1, . . . , q − 1.
Given a permutation =(a10, a20, . . . , an0 ) of In, let us construct a correspondingmatching
M as follows: LetW = V initially, and let us consider the (unique) best choice path
F 1 = {(a10, 0), (a11, 1), . . . , (a1s−1, s − 1)}
starting from (a10, 0) in G[W ]. Let us then delete these vertices, set W ′ = W\F 1, and
consider the (unique) best choice path
F 2 = {(a20, 0), (a21, 1), . . . , (a2s−1, s − 1)}
starting from (a20, 0) in the induced subgraphG[W ′], etc. Clearly, the paths F 1, F 2, …, Fn
are pairwise disjoint families, and thus
M = {F 1, F 2, . . . , F n}
is a matching. Let us call a matching M a best choice matching if M =M for some
permutation .
Theorem 2. If ns, a stable best choice matching always exists in an s-sided system with
purely cyclic preferences.
Before proving this claim, let us state a few helpful lemmas.
Fixing a best choice matchingM, and using the notation as above, the sets {aij | i ∈ In}
for j ∈ Zs all form permutations of In. With this notation, the ith family of the matching
is formed by the ith elements of these permutations. We can also view any other family
as well, as simply selecting the i(j)th element from the j th permutation, for some indices
i(j) for j ∈ Zs . Accordingly, we shall refer to such a family F as F = (ai(j)j | j ∈ Zs) in
the sequel.
Lemma 4. LetM be a best choice matching, and let F = (ai(j)j | j ∈ Zs) be a breakingfamily with respect toM. Then
i(0)> i(1)> · · ·> i(s − 1).
Proof. By the deﬁnition of a breaking family, we must have
(a
i(j+1)
j+1 , j + 1)(ai(j)j ,j)(a
i(j)
j+1, j + 1)
for all j ∈ Zs , where (ai(j)j , j) belongs to in the matchingM. By the deﬁnition ofM,
(a
i(j)
j+1, j + 1) is the best choice of (ai(j)j , j) among all those in Gj+1 not appearing in the
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ﬁrst i(j)− 1 families F 1, . . . , F i(j)−1. Hence, the individual (ai(j+1)j+1 , j + 1) must belong
to one of these ﬁrst i(j)− 1 families, i.e. i(j)> i(j + 1). 
Corollary 1. If n< s, all best choice matchings are stable in a s-sided system with purely
cyclic preferences.
Proof. Clearly, the condition in Lemma 4 cannot hold, unless the matchingM has at least
s families. Thus, if n< s, a best choice matchingM cannot have a breaking family with
respect to it. 
Proof of Theorem 2. In view of Corollary 1, it is enough to show that if n = s then
there always exists a stable best choice matching in an s-sided system with purely cyclic
preferences.
To see this, let us observe ﬁrst that in a best choice matching M the element a1s−1
depends only on the selection of a10 (and not on the rest of the permutation ). This deﬁnes
a mapping  : In −→ In by setting (a10)= a1s−1 for all possible choices of a10 ∈ In.
Let us observe next that if n= s then by Lemma 4 there is only one candidate breaking
family, namelyF=(an0 , an−11 , . . . , a1s−1). For this unique family to be breakingwith respect
toM it is necessary that
(an0 , 0)(a1s−1,s−1)(a
1
0, 0) (1)
and
(an−11 , 1)(an0 ,0)(an1 , 1). (2)
Case I: There exists an index i ∈ In such that (i, 0) ∈ G0 is not the worst choice of the
individual ((i), s − 1) ∈ Gs−1. In this case let us choose  such that a10 = i, and an0 is the
element for which (an0 , 0) ∈ G0 is the worst choice of ((i), s−1) ∈ Gs−1. Then the unique
candidate family F cannot be breaking by the necessity of (1), and thus the matchingM
is stable.
Case II: For all i ∈ In the individual (i, 0) ∈ G0 is the worst choice of ((i), s − 1) ∈
Gs−1. This implies that (i) = (i′) whenever i = i′ (since no individual can have two
different worst choices). This fact further implies that all individuals in G0 have different
ﬁrst choices (since otherwise two ﬁrst choice paths would converge, implying the existence
of indices i = i′ with (i)= (i′), i.e., Case I would apply). Thus, (an1 , 1) ∈ G1 is the ﬁrst
choice of (an0 , 0), and hence it is preferred more than (a
n−1
1 , 1), implying that F cannot
be breaking by the necessity of (2). Since this conclusion is reached regardless how the
permutation  was chosen, all best choice matchings are stable in this case. 
Let us remark ﬁnally that for n> s we may not be able to ﬁnd a stable matching among
best choice ones. Namely, in a best choice matching at least s − 1> 0 individuals realize
their ﬁrst choice (the ﬁrst s−1 individuals in the ﬁrst family F 1 surely do so). This however
is not true already in the classical case of s = 2. To see this, let us consider an example
involving 4 men and 4 women,M = {m1,m2,m3,m4} andW = {w1, w2, w3, w4}, and the
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purely cyclic preferences
w2m1w1m1w3m1w4,
w3m2w2m2w1m2w4,
w2m3w3m3w1m3w4,
w3m4w4m4w2m4 , w1,
m4w1m1w1m2w1m3,
m4w2m2w2m1w2m3,
m1w3m3w3m4w3m2,
m1w4m4w4m2w4m3.
It is easy to see that M = {(m1, w1), (m2, w2), (m3, w3), (m4, w4)} is the only stable
matching in this instance, and in this matching no individual could realize his/her ﬁrst
choice. In fact, all individuals got their second best choices.
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